The landslide of 2018, the warning of 2026

Lee Hyun-sang
 
The author is a columnist at the JoongAng Ilbo. 

The election calendar facing the Lee Jae Myung administration closely resembles that of the Moon Jae-in government. Both administrations confronted local elections about a year after taking office and parliamentary elections roughly three years into their terms. Two presidential impeachments altered Korea’s political timetable, creating unavoidable comparisons between the two progressive governments.
 
President Lee Jae Myung delivers a memorial address during the 71st Memorial Day ceremony at the Seoul National Cemetery in Dongjak District, Seoul, on June 6, three days after the nationwide local elections. [JOINT PRESS CORPS]

 
The Democratic Party (DP) achieved a historic landslide in the 2018 local elections, held 13 months after Moon took office. It won 14 of 17 metropolitan mayoral and gubernatorial races. The predecessor of today’s People Power Party (PPP) captured only Daegu and North Gyeongsang Province. Independent Jeju Governor Won Hee-ryong’s reelection was one of the few surprises.
 
In Seoul, Mayor Park Won-soon won a third term. DP candidates swept 24 of the city’s 25 district mayoral races, losing only Seocho District. Moon’s high approval ratings, expectations for inter-Korean reconciliation and a divided opposition helped produce the result. The governing party also benefited from its campaign theme of eliminating the remnants of past political misconduct.
 
The June 3 local elections initially seemed likely to follow a similar pattern. Early forecasts suggested the governing camp could win as many as 15 of the 16 major metropolitan races. The final outcome, however, delivered a more complicated message.
 
The DP failed to meet expectations in Daegu and lost South Gyeongsang Province. More importantly, the defeats of Chong Won-o in the Seoul mayoral race and Ha Jung-woo in a parliamentary by-election were significant setbacks. Both had been viewed as candidates closely associated with President Lee.
 
One explanation is that voters have learned from experience. Having lived through two presidential impeachments, many have become wary of concentrating excessive power in one political camp. The public appears willing to punish an opposition it considers ineffective while still preserving checks on the governing party. The result reflected conditional support rather than unconditional endorsement.
 
The governing party also struggled to present a compelling vision beyond its message of overcoming the political turmoil that preceded Lee’s election. Critics argued that it became complacent and overconfident.
 
Several controversies contributed to voter fatigue among moderates. One involved efforts to pursue a special counsel investigation tied to canceling presidential indictments, which opponents portrayed as an attempt to erase the president’s legal troubles through political means. Another stemmed from aggressive attacks related to the Starbucks Korea marketing controversy. While neither issue dominated the campaign, both reinforced concerns about political excess.
 
On the eve of the election, Lee told prosecutors during a Cabinet meeting to “correct mistakes if there are any.” Although directed at the prosecution service, the remark left some voters with the impression that he was indirectly referring to his own legal controversies.
 
Attention in political circles is now shifting toward the 2028 parliamentary elections, widely viewed as a stepping stone to the 2030 presidential race.
 
The Moon administration offers a cautionary lesson. During the Covid-19 pandemic, the DP won a commanding 180-seat majority in the 2020 parliamentary elections. Yet public sentiment later shifted as controversies surrounding Cho Kuk and frustrations over housing policy accumulated. The government ultimately failed to secure a successor from the same political camp.
 
Political support can erode faster than many leaders expect. If the Lee administration hopes to avoid repeating that trajectory, it must pay close attention to the warning embedded in this election.
 
The governing party may also find that the advantages of facing a weak opposition are fading. The election highlighted widespread distrust of PPP leader Jang Dong-hyeok. While that may benefit the DP in the short term, it also means the governing camp can no longer rely on gains generated by what critics describe as outdated conservative rhetoric.
 
If the defining political risk of the Moon administration was the Cho Kuk controversy, this election suggested that the greatest risk facing the Lee administration may be efforts to overturn or neutralize the president’s legal problems through political action.
 
Ignoring that warning could prove costly. The more aggressively the government pursues such efforts, the faster public support could cool. Even if those initiatives succeed temporarily, a future administration could reverse them.
 
A more realistic path may be for Lee to focus on governing achievements while seeking political compromise with the opposition rather than relying on displays of power.
 
The June 3 election allowed the government to govern while simultaneously delivering a warning. More important than the number of victories or defeats was the message contained in the results. If that message is ignored, the risk of the Lee administration following the path of the Moon government will only increase.