Bright lights, red city: North Korean leader Kim keeps Pyongyang lit while the rest of the country remains in darkness

[A STUDY OF KIM JONG-UN 1]

Feb. 28, 2019, is a day North Korean leader Kim Jong-un will never forget. It is the date of the "no deal Hanoi summit," in which U.S. President Donald Trump walked out of negotiations in Vietnam, an insult the North Korean leader had never experienced before. Could Kim himself have ever imagined that, just over six years later, he would stand shoulder to shoulder with the leaders of China and Russia at the viewing gallery of Tiananmen Square in Beijing in September last year? 

Kim’s elevated strategic status is a reality. He is no longer in a hurry. Even if Trump sends another overture, his new position would be to casually ignore it. How did the young leader of Northeast Asia’s poorest nation, once treated merely as a joke, reach his current position? What choices did Kim make to overcome the failure of the Hanoi summit, and how has North Korea changed as a result of those choices? How has this change altered South Korea’s security environment? We must now deal with a Kim of a different caliber. That is why we must study him now.   -  Ed. 

“Let us conserve even a single watt of electricity to the utmost and manage the nation’s affairs with painstaking frugality and discipline.”

Those words came from North Korea leader Kim Jong-un’s New Year’s address on Jan. 1, 2014. At the time, the young leader, then about 30 years old, was grappling with North Korea’s chronic electricity shortages. A pledge he had reportedly made before taking power — to ensure that people could “eat white rice and meat soup within three years” in 2010 — had already faded from reality.

During the winter of 2014 and 2015, Pyongyang experienced one of its worst blackout crises in years. Foreign media reports said that even diplomatic residential areas suffered such low voltage that household appliances would not function, and tap water remained cold.

Although impossible to independently verify, stories also circulated that officials had been instructed to use desk lamps instead of ceiling lights, while defectors testified that lights illuminating statues of North Korean founder Kim Il Sung would frequently go dark during power outages.

Yet, only days after Kim Jong-un called for a nationwide campaign of austerity, North Korean state media introduced the state-run Songyong Lighting Research Institute, tasked with creating “artistic nightscapes of lights” in Pyongyang and elsewhere. The institute was originally established by his father, the late North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, but Kim Jong-un elevated its status and renamed it “Songyong,” meaning a mystical landscape. What Kim ultimately wanted to perfect with such meticulous management was a brightly illuminated Pyongyang whose dazzling lights would never go out.

Though its capital could not yet be illuminated so brilliantly, this was also the period when projects such as the construction of Mirae Scientists Street in Pyongyang accelerated, and diplomats stationed in the capital began informally referring to the city as “Pyonghattan,” a portmanteau of Pyongyang and Manhattan. At the same time, however, newly built high-rise apartment towers often couldn’t operate their elevators due to electricity shortages, leading residents to avoid upper floors.

More than a decade later, Kim’s vision now appears closer to reality. A joint research team led by professors Kim Ji-hee, an economics professor at KAIST, and Cha Mee-young, a professor at KAIST’s School of Computing, in collaboration with Germany-based Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy, analyzed satellite data to measure nighttime illumination levels across North Korea’s cities, counties and districts. Their findings suggest that North Korea’s nights have changed.

But behind the brighter lights lies an uncomfortable reality. In a country where most regions remain dark like a vast black hole in Northeast Asia, only a small number of “islands of light” have emerged. Those illuminated areas share one thing in common: they are all places considered essential in some way to Kim Jong-un’s rule. In North Korea, even the nighttime streets appear to brighten only where Kim permits.

The question, then, is how much brighter North Korea’s nights have truly become — and for whom those lights are shining.

Using satellite imagery, the research team tracked changes in nighttime illumination across 178 cities, counties and districts in North Korea between January 2022 and October 2025. Their analysis found that nighttime brightness increased by an average of 25.9 percent during that period. Ahn Dong-hyun, a researcher at the Max Planck Institute who handled data processing for the study, said, "Nighttime illuminance can be viewed as a measure of actual economic vitality."

Russia's systematic support despite UN sanctions

The rise in North Korea’s nighttime brightness appears closely tied to South Korean military assessments that Pyongyang had begun supplying weapons to Russia starting in mid-2022.

The White House warned in 2024 that Russia would likely compensate North Korea with energy assistance. At the same time, Russia supported the modernization of North Korea’s railway system, while Pier 3 at Rajin Port — used by cargo vessels traveling to and from Russia — resumed operations. According to intelligence authorities, Russia is estimated to have supplied North Korea with 1.5 million barrels of refined petroleum products in 2024 alone, despite a UN Security Council sanctions cap limiting annual deliveries to 500,000 barrels.

Russia also laid institutional groundwork for closer ties. Moscow spearheaded the dismantling of the UN panel of experts monitoring sanctions on North Korea in March 2024, and in June of that year, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un signed a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement explicitly mentioning “peaceful nuclear energy and energy cooperation.”

While it cannot be conclusively stated that the increase in nighttime illumination was entirely due to Russian support, it is difficult to view as a coincidence the fact that North Korea’s nights began to grow brighter at the same time that Pyongyang and Moscow visibly deepened their alignment.

'The father of Pyongyang'

Not all parts of North Korea, however, brightened equally.

Pyongyang saw the most dramatic increase. Based on observations taken during October, when weather conditions were clearest for satellite monitoring, Pyongyang’s nighttime illumination in 2025 measured 16,495.55 — nearly nine times higher than the average for all other regions in North Korea, excluding the capital, which stood at 1,851.94. Compared to 2022, Pyongyang’s brightness increased by 116.5 percent.

The brightest place was Pyongyang. Based on October, the clearest month for observation, the nighttime illuminance in Pyongyang in 2025 was 16,495.55 nanowatts per square centimeter per steradian, nearly nine times the average for all other regions of North Korea, excluding Pyongyang, at 1,851.94. Compared to 2022, it became 116.5 percent brighter.

A popular saying in North Korea captures the perception: “Kim Il Sung was the father of the people, Kim Jong-il was the father of the military, and Kim Jong-un is the father of Pyongyang.” The saying reflects the belief that, for Kim Jong-un, “the people” primarily refers to the residents of Pyongyang, the core of the regime’s power structure. That is why Pyongyang lies at the center of what some describe as Kim’s “electricity dictatorship.”

The city recording the second-largest increase in brightness was Wonsan in Kangwon Province, which rose by 2,037.2. By growth rate alone, however, Wonsan ranked first, with a 197.3 percent increase.

Wonsan is both Kim Jong-un’s hometown and a key hub for the regime’s tourism development ambitions, making it closely tied to the leader’s political legacy. In 2014, North Korea designated the Wonsan Kalma Coastal Tourist Zone as a special tourism district and began developing it into a broader tourism complex linked with the Mount Kumgang tourism region and Masikryong Ski Resort. Construction repeatedly stalled because sanctions complicated access to materials, but work accelerated in recent years, and the resort reportedly opened to domestic visitors in July last year. Kim Jong-un’s ultimate goal is believed to be earning foreign currency from Russian and Chinese tourists. Wonsan is also home to major industrial facilities, including a steel plant, a tractor factory, a chemical factory, a shipyard and a gold refinery.

Sinuiju in North Pyongan Province ranked third for increased illumination. The city’s brightness rose from 1,550.16 in 2022 to 3,088.35 in 2025, an increase of 99.2 percent.

Sinuiju is one of North Korea’s major machinery and chemical industrial centers. It hosts the Rakwon Machine Complex, which manufactures large excavators and military equipment, as well as a shipyard and chemical fiber factory. The city suffered severe flooding in July 2024, after which North Korea launched rapid housing construction projects. Some analysts question whether the apartments are truly habitable, but multiple testimonies claim the new buildings are brightly illuminated at night after completion.

Military-industrial belt and renewed energy supply

The connection between rising nighttime illumination and North Korea’s defense industry becomes clearer when examining the top 30 regions with the largest increases in illumination.

Traditional military production hubs, key to ammunition and missile manufacturing, became noticeably brighter.

One example is Kusong in North Pyongan Province, which ranked eighth in increased illumination between 2022 and 2025. The city, historically known as the site of the Battle of Kwiju during the Goryeo Dynasty (918-1392), is home to Panghyon Airport, the Plant No. 95 ammunition plant and Kusong Machine Tool Factory, which manufactures computerized numerical control machine tools considered critical for missile development.

Chagang Province also drew attention. Kanggye, the provincial capital often referred to as “the mecca of North Korea’s arms industry,” houses facilities such as No. 26 Factory, which produces artillery shells and surface-to-air missiles, and No. 93 Factory, which manufactures precision machinery and ammunition. Although Kanggye itself ranked only around 80th in illumination growth, combining figures from major defense-production areas — including Rangrim County, ranked fifth, and Huichon, ranked 54th — suggests the province may have been the second-largest beneficiary of increased energy allocation after Pyongyang.

Regions associated with strategic weapons development tied directly to Kim’s nuclear program also grew brighter.

Nampo, ranked seventh, is one of North Korea’s principal port-industrial cities and an important export hub. It hosts the Thaesong Machine Factory, also known as the Chamjin Missile Factory, a key site in North Korea’s intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) program, as well as the Kumsong Tractor Factory, which produces components for self-propelled artillery. Nampo Shipyard serves as both a naval base and a shipbuilding center, and activity linked to submarine-launched ballistic missile testing has also been detected there. Kim visited the site in February 2024 and described it as a “reliable, large-scale military shipbuilding base.”

The prominence of Yongbyon, ranked 48th, and Kilju, ranked 23rd and home to the Punggye-ri nuclear test site, also drew attention. In November 2025, the U.S.-based Pyongyang monitoring outlet 38 North, citing satellite imagery, reported that modernization and expansion work at the Yongbyon nuclear complex had continued, particularly around a presumed new uranium enrichment facility.

After deciding to support Russia, Kim reportedly ordered military factories nationwide to operate at full capacity. That may help explain why regions containing key arms-production facilities became brighter at night. It also suggests that a cycle may already be in place in which Russian-provided energy fuels increased weapons production in North Korean factories, with those weapons then exported back to Russia.

Chagang Province, however, also suffered severe flood damage, as did Sinuiju. Some of the increase in illumination may therefore reflect reconstruction efforts. Even so, the findings suggest Kim selectively distributed Russian energy assistance according to political priorities.

A pipeline of energy flows toward Pyongyang and strategic industries

The data indicate that Russian-supplied energy is flowing disproportionately to regions that help strengthen Kim Jong-un's rule.

In particular, nighttime illumination patterns from 2022 to 2025 appear to trace what researchers describe as an “electricity dictatorship pipeline,” from Rason, ranked 31st and functioning as a gateway for imports from Russia, to Bukchang, ranked sixth and a key electricity-production hub, and Chongjin, ranked fourth, before ultimately reaching Pyongyang, the regime’s primary center of consumption.

Russia appears to supply oil through Rason via cargo ships, while energy-producing regions such as South Pyongan Province’s Pukchang and North Hamgyong Province’s Chongjin also benefit from external support. Yet much of the electricity generated does not flow to ordinary residents. Instead, Pyongyang and military-industrial cities absorb most of it like energy black holes.

Light crosses the border but does not spread to the entire population.

Another notable finding is the pattern of yearly increases. Across North Korea as a whole, nighttime illumination rose 26.2 percent from 2022 to 2023, but growth stagnated at minus 0.4 percent between 2023 and 2025. In effect, nearly all gains recorded over the three years were concentrated in 2022 and 2023.

Because signs of Russian energy assistance continued to emerge after 2023, the stagnation may reflect not a halt in electricity supply but a shift in how power was distributed. Expanded underground activity related to military production is one possibility, though it is difficult to detect in satellite imagery alone.

Only four locations nationwide recorded larger increases between 2023 and 2025 than during 2022 and 2023: Wonsan, Sinuiju, Uiju County in North Pyongan Province and Sinpo in South Hamgyong Province.

Sinpo Shipyard is North Korea’s principal submarine development base. It is also believed to be the location where Kim unveiled what he claimed last December was a nuclear-powered strategic submarine. Uiju, adjacent to Sinuiju, functions as a logistical and industrial support area for the city.

The existence of these four outliers suggests that even as nationwide electricity growth slowed, the regime continued directing power toward politically symbolic development projects and military-related regions. Wonsan is especially striking. While nighttime illumination increased by 38 percent between 2022 and 2023, it surged by 115.4 percent from 2023 to 2025, apparently reflecting the regime’s recent push to complete the Wonsan-Kalma development zone.

Comparisons between North and South Korean nighttime illumination further underscore the disparity.

As of 2024, Seoul — measured across its 25 districts — recorded nighttime illumination of 182,437.66, making it 14.3 times brighter than Pyongyang. Measured by density per unit area, Seoul was 26.3 times brighter.

In South Korea, only Yeongyang County in North Gyeongsang, one of the country’s darkest regions at 1,936.84, approached the low levels seen in North Korea. Pyongyang, at 12,794.04, was the only North Korean region brighter than Yeongyang. Yeongyang had a population of just 15,165 last year, making it South Korea’s least populated county, excluding Ulleung County in North Gyeongsang.

The comparison highlights how severe North Korea’s electricity shortages remain compared to those in the South. Yet even the increase in available power appears to be distributed in line with Kim’s political priorities.

“Analyzing nighttime illuminance data reveals that the concentration in Pyongyang is intensifying, with the gap in lighting between Pyongyang and the provinces widening,” KAIST's Prof. Kim said. “This demonstrates the structural limitations of the North Korean economy, where limited energy is inevitably diverted to Pyongyang and other priority areas due to an absolute lack of resources to support balanced development policies.”

Thus, saying that North Korea’s nights have grown brighter is only half true. The reality is that only the places necessary to sustain Kim Jong-un’s power have become brighter.

Leader Kim has not merely gained access to more light. He has also gained the power to decide which places remain illuminated — and which remain in darkness.

BY YOO JEE-HYE    [kim.sarah@joongang.co.kr]