Putin turns away from Iran, raising questions in Pyongyang

Lee Seung-ho

The author is a reporter at the JoongAng Ilbo

Russian President Vladimir Putin has refrained from providing military support to Iran amid its recent 12-day standoff with Israel and the United States, despite years of defense cooperation between the two nations. Observers say this calculated distance, particularly during Iran’s time of need, signals a shift in Moscow’s foreign policy priorities — one that North Korean leader Kim Jong-un is likely watching with unease.

On June 23, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi visited Moscow amid the conflict, seeking at least diplomatic backing. Putin’s response was limited to describing the airstrikes as “acts of aggression.” There was no mention of military assistance.

Since the outbreak of the Ukraine war in 2022, Iran has supplied Russia with thousands of drones, artillery shells and ammunition. In January of this year, the two countries signed a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement. Yet during Iran’s brief war, Russia maintained a conspicuous silence.

Russian officials justified their inaction by pointing to the absence of a mutual defense clause in the agreement and claimed that Tehran never formally requested assistance. Still, many analysts argue that Russia’s restraint influenced Iran’s eventual decision to accept U.S.-brokered cease-fire efforts.

Experts believe Putin’s primary concern remains the war in Ukraine. Maintaining a stable relationship with U.S. President Donald Trump, who is expected to play a critical role in potential cease-fire negotiations, is seen as crucial. “If Putin frustrates Trump by involving himself in Iran, Trump could retaliate with renewed economic sanctions, undermining Russia’s position,” said Holger Schmieding, chief economist at Berenberg Bank, in an interview with CNBC.

Putin also needs to preserve relations with Middle Eastern powers such as Saudi Arabia, especially for oil price coordination. Taking sides in Iran’s conflict risks alienating these partners. Additionally, Russia’s domestic political considerations complicate matters; Israel is home to around two million Russian-speaking Jews, making any confrontation politically sensitive.

“The top priority for Russia is to avoid alienating any of its key partners,” said Nikolay Kozhanov, a professor at Qatar University, in an interview with The Wall Street Journal. “That’s why Moscow stayed out of the fighting.”

Iran’s strategic value to Russia has also declined. The Shahed-136 drones Tehran once supplied are now being manufactured in Russia under the name Geran-2, with upgrades in engines, warheads and electronic warfare capabilities. Hannah Notte of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies told the Financial Times that Russia’s early dependency on Iranian munitions has largely shifted toward imports from North Korea and China.

This growing indifference is not unique to the latest war. According to Foreign Policy, Russia stood by as Israel attacked Iran-backed groups like Hezbollah and Hamas, and when Syria’s pro-Iran Assad regime faced setbacks. With its military overstretched in Ukraine, Russia appears unwilling to extend itself in the Middle East.

The implications are significant for North Korea. Like Iran, Pyongyang signed a comprehensive strategic agreement with Russia June last year. It also sent two waves of military personnel — estimated at 15,000 troops — to Russia’s Kursk region last year and earlier this year. These moves were seen as part of North Korea’s effort to bypass sanctions with Russia’s backing.

During the Iran conflict, North Korea aligned rhetorically with Moscow. Its foreign ministry issued two statements criticizing the U.S. and Israel but did not voice support for Iran. North Korea-focused outlet 38 North suggested that Pyongyang likely coordinated this nuanced stance with Moscow, watching closely how Russia responded to Iran.

Yet this very observation may have raised concerns within North Korea’s leadership. Professor Park Won-gon of Ewha Womans University noted that North Korea could no longer assume automatic Russian military backing in a crisis. “North Korea and Russia may have a defense clause on paper,” Park said, “but in authoritarian systems, commitments are flexible. If Putin prioritizes Trump over Pyongyang, Kim could find himself abandoned.”

The precedent set by U.S. strikes on Iranian territory — framed under the banner of nuclear nonproliferation — could also complicate North Korea’s diplomatic strategy. Kim had hoped to use direct negotiations with Trump to secure nuclear recognition and relief from sanctions. But Washington’s willingness to strike Iran, a country with uranium enrichment nearing weapons-grade levels, may indicate a harder line against rogue nuclear states.

Park added, “Kim is probably recalling Trump’s 2017 ‘fire and fury’ rhetoric. After resolving the Middle East crisis, Trump’s attention could easily shift to North Korea, as early as next year.”

In anticipation, Pyongyang may seek to “raise its price.” Yang Uk, a research fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, said Kim could intensify nuclear development and showcase progress to distinguish North Korea from Iran. “There’s also the possibility of military provocations to signal that, unlike the Middle East, South Korea and Japan are unlikely to launch bold pre-emptive strikes,” Yang said.

Pressure on Russia could also increase. On June 17, Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu visited Pyongyang and agreed to a third troop deployment — 6,000 North Korean engineers and military construction personnel — to the Kursk region. South Korea’s National Intelligence Service expects the deployment as early as July or August.

“Kim will try to tighten his grip on Putin,” Park said. “This third deployment is likely aimed at binding Russia closer, making it harder for Putin to walk away from the alliance.”

Translated from the JoongAng Ilbo using generative AI and edited by Korea JoongAng Daily staff.