Latin America’s ‘blue tide’ is not Trump’s doing

Cha Se-hyeon

The author is an editorial writer at the JoongAng Ilbo.

Keiko Fujimori, the conservative candidate who ran for Peru’s presidency for a fourth time, won last month’s election. Fujimori, 51, is the daughter of former President Alberto Fujimori, who governed Peru from 1990 to 2000 before serving 16 years in prison on human rights and corruption charges.

Yet global attention has focused less on her victory than on whether the “blue tide” — the wave of right-wing governments sweeping Latin America since last year — has reached its peak. This year’s presidential elections brought conservative administrations to power in Bolivia, Costa Rica, Chile and Colombia. Last year, right-wing candidates prevailed in Argentina, Paraguay, Ecuador and Honduras. Only Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay remain under left-leaning governments.

The second Trump administration declared in its national security strategy last year that Latin America should be viewed not merely as America’s “backyard” but as a “strategic space” within the Western Hemisphere. President Donald Trump used tariff threats to pressure left-wing governments and openly supported pro-American conservative leaders.

Does Latin America’s blue tide, then, represent a victory for Trump?

Experts argue that while Trump’s intervention may have accelerated the shift, the decisive factor lies in the failures of the left-wing governments that dominated the region during the 2000s.

The earlier “pink tide” emerged as a reaction against U.S.-style neoliberal reforms. Leftist governments expanded the role of the state, emphasizing redistribution over growth and social equity over efficiency. At the same time, China’s industrialization fueled demand for oil, copper, iron ore and soybeans, pushing up the prices of Latin America’s key exports. Governments used the resulting revenues to expand welfare programs and public spending. In essence, the pink tide was built on a redistribution-oriented state.

That model unraveled when commodity prices fell. As government revenues declined, generous welfare policies became fiscal burdens. Many countries failed to use the boom years to strengthen their industrial bases because so much public money had been devoted to redistribution. Long periods of left-wing rule also exposed corruption, administrative inefficiency and the unchecked growth of the public sector.

Across the region, countries became vulnerable to chronic fiscal crises and inflation while struggling to contain organized crime, drug cartels and illegal migration. Ha Sang-sub, a professor at the Korea National Diplomatic Academy, argues that the pink tide enlarged the role of the state without improving its ability to function.

“The limitations of the pink tide stemmed from the fact that it expanded government functions without strengthening state capacity,” Ha said. “The current blue tide represents a transition from a redistribution state to a capable state.”

Conservative parties have capitalized on those frustrations. In elections over the past two years, right-wing candidates campaigned on fiscal discipline, market reform, stronger public security and tougher measures against organized crime. In Peru, Fujimori promised to establish an El Salvador-style mega-prison system, promote private investment and reduce bureaucracy. Her opponent, incumbent left-wing candidate Roberto Sánchez, who lost by just 0.27 percentage points, emphasized more traditional progressive policies, including constitutional reform, a larger economic role for the state and increased social spending.

The age of strategic competition between the United States and China is also an age of economic security centered on supply chains. For resource-rich Latin America, it presents another opportunity. Infrastructure such as the Panama Canal and Peru’s Chancay port has likewise gained strategic importance.

Having experienced the shortcomings of the pink tide, many voters have chosen a different path. Beyond restoring public order, conservative governments have promised to strengthen state capacity, attract investment and deepen participation in global supply chains. In that sense, their agenda overlaps with the Trump administration’s emphasis on economic security.

Still, there are at least two reasons Washington’s strategy cannot be regarded as the principal cause of Latin America’s conservative turn.

The first is that many of the region’s new right-wing governments pursue what scholars call “strategic autonomy.” Rather than choosing between the United States and China, they seek to use competition between the two powers as diplomatic leverage. Brazil has long embraced that approach, while Chile and Peru increasingly use their mineral resources as bargaining tools. Argentina, despite moving closer to Washington, continues to cooperate with Beijing in finance and mining.

The second reason is that resentment toward Trump’s tariffs and trade pressure has, in some cases, strengthened support for left-leaning governments. Brazil offers a clear example. Ahead of October’s presidential election, Senator Flávio Bolsonaro, the son of former President Jair Bolsonaro and a leading figure in the far-right Liberal Party, had been running neck and neck with incumbent President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of the Workers’ Party. But public opinion has shifted toward Lula after the Office of the United States Trade Representative announced retaliatory tariffs of 25 percent on major Brazilian exports under Section 301 of U.S. trade law.

A similar trend can be seen in Mexico. President Claudia Sheinbaum, a center-left leader, has maintained strong domestic support despite facing persistent pressure from Washington.

Latin America’s blue tide, therefore, cannot be explained simply as an extension of Trump’s foreign policy. It reflects the region’s search for governments capable of delivering economic stability, public security and a stronger position in an era shaped by supply chains and great-power competition.