A summit that did not fail

Yoo Jee-hye

The author is the head of the diplomatic and security news department at the JoongAng Ilbo.

Diplomats like to say there is no such thing as a failed summit. The reasoning is simple: Once leaders sit down together, the meeting must be judged a success. In high-level diplomacy, even small mistakes can carry outsized costs.

Yet in the age of Donald Trump, this old maxim no longer feels so reliable. Many leaders have been embarrassed by encounters with the American president. Some, fearing worse outcomes, have even chosen to accept humiliation rather than risk confrontation.

Russian President Vladimir Putin, left, and Chinese President Xi Jinping take part in a photo ceremony at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Tianjin on Sept. 1. [REUTERS/YONHAP]
Russian President Vladimir Putin, left, and Chinese President Xi Jinping take part in a photo ceremony at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Tianjin on Sept. 1.

That backdrop explains why Seoul prepared so cautiously for President Lee Jae Myung’s first summit with President Trump in Washington on Aug. 25. Officials mapped out scenarios, including the worst possible cases. The fact that none of those scenarios unfolded was, in itself, enough to conclude that the summit did not fail.

More than that, Lee managed to build personal rapport with Trump. In a White House where decisions concentrate in the president’s hands, that bond was no small matter. Smiles filled the private talks and the word “trust” came up repeatedly. U.S. officials even remarked that the tone of this meeting was the most positive of more than a dozen summits held since Trump began his second term.

Chinese President Xi Jinping, accompanied by Kim Jong Un, chairman of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) and chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), watch a large group callisthenics and art performance at the May Day Stadium in Pyongyang, DPRK, June 20, 2019. [XINHUA/YONHAP]
Chinese President Xi Jinping, accompanied by Kim Jong Un, chairman of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) and chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), watch a large group callisthenics and art performance at the May Day Stadium in Pyongyang, DPRK, June 20, 2019.

Still, the question lingers: What did Korea gain? For Lee, the meeting was a chance to counter a perception in Washington that his government leaned toward Beijing. By signaling the end of the longstanding formula of “security with the United States, economy with China,” he made a bold turn even previous conservative presidents had avoided.

That shift carries weight for Lee’s political standing. But ordinary Koreans may find it hard to identify tangible results. For Trump, the benefits were clearer. He could cite new pledges of $150 billion in Korean corporate investment in the United States.

Reporting on the summit highlighted this imbalance. Headlines came easily, but filling in details proved more difficult. Trump’s preference for leaving little paper trail may mark his second term, yet with no joint statement, assessing gains and losses was guesswork. In normal times, positive chemistry between leaders filters down to officials and produces agreements. The absence of a document suggested that momentum did not travel far.

Some in Seoul argue that having no agreement worked in Korea’s favor. The government had already promised a $350 billion financial package. Washington wanted written commitments specifying how much of that would go into direct investment and where the funds would flow. By avoiding a signed statement, Seoul sidestepped those demands.

But summits serve a unique role: They can resolve issues too sensitive for working-level negotiators. Without top-level agreement, bureaucrats rarely make breakthroughs. The lack of conclusions leaves unfinished business, postponing the very success the summit was supposed to secure.

External timing also mattered. Soon after Lee’s return, Pyongyang announced that Kim Jong-un would attend China’s celebration of the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II on Sept. 3 in Beijing at the invitation of Chinese President Xi Jinping. That signal, combined with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s confirmed participation, meant that a visibly failed U.S.-Korea summit would have been awkward for not only Seoul, but also Washington.

For years, the alignment of Korea, the United States and Japan against North Korea, China and Russia was loose, shaped partly by Xi’s reluctance to embrace Pyongyang. But Xi’s choice to stand with Kim and Putin on Tiananmen Square indicated a sharper trilateral bloc. North Korea’s presence completed the picture.

Korean President Lee Jae Myung, right, is greeted by U.S. President Donald Trump ahead of their first bilateral summit at the White House in Washington on Aug. 25. [JOINT PRESS CORPS]
Korean President Lee Jae Myung, right, is greeted by U.S. President Donald Trump ahead of their first bilateral summit at the White House in Washington on Aug. 25.

Seoul learned of Kim’s planned trip before the summit. China reportedly conveyed the news through diplomatic channels. It is likely that Washington knew as well. With Xi gathering Kim and Putin to project unity, Trump had little interest in producing a failed summit with Seoul.

Kim’s diplomatic gain may prove as significant as the U.S.-Korea talks. However it is framed, Pyongyang and Beijing are likely to announce some form of economic cooperation. That outcome will bolster Kim’s confidence in his nuclear stance. Their “successful” summit represents a new challenge for Seoul.

Lee and Trump can fairly claim their meeting did not fail. But for Korea, the absence of a clear payoff remains troubling. The value of trust between leaders will be tested only when it leads to concrete results at the working level. Until then, the summit stands as a pause rather than a breakthrough.

This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.