North Korea’s quiet build-up poses security dilemma for new president

Audio report: written by reporters, read by AI

Jeong Yong-soo

The author is an editorial writer and the director of the Unification and Culture Research Institute of the JoongAng Ilbo.

In a marked departure from past patterns, North Korea remained largely silent as South Korea held its 21st presidential election. The absence of a direct provocation was striking, particularly given Pyongyang’s track record of escalating military tensions during such political transitions. But this silence should not be mistaken for disengagement. Instead, North Korea has been accelerating its conventional military build-up in ways that present an increasingly complex security equation for the new administration of President Lee Jae-myung.

Historically, North Korea has used South Korean election cycles as opportunities to flex its military muscle. In October 1997, two months before the 15th presidential election, South Korean officials were convicted of reaching out to North Korea, requesting a military demonstration near the Demilitarized Zone. In 2017, just weeks before the 19th presidential vote, North Korea’s official newspaper went as far as to warn against the return of conservative leadership in Seoul.

Similar patterns were observed during previous transitions. Just two days after President Yoon Suk Yeol took office in 2022, North Korea fired a short-range ballistic missile. Two weeks later, immediately following the return of U.S. President Joe Biden from his visit to Korea, Pyongyang launched an intercontinental ballistic missile. The Moon Jae-in administration faced a similar scenario in 2017, when North Korea conducted several missile tests and a sixth nuclear test before engaging in rare inter-Korean diplomacy during the PyeongChang Winter Olympics the following year. During the early days of the Park Geun-hye and Lee Myung-bak administrations, North Korea conducted missile launches and crossed maritime boundaries, further underscoring a long-standing pattern of election-related provocation regardless of the political leaning of the new South Korean leader.

This year, however, North Korea refrained from such high-profile displays. The shift may reflect Pyongyang’s recalibrated stance following Kim Jong-un’s declaration in late 2023 that inter-Korean relations are now those of “hostile belligerents.” North Korea may be signaling that it no longer considers developments in the South relevant to its own strategic calculations. Yet Kim’s movements in April and May suggest otherwise. Though there were no direct provocations, Kim oversaw air force drills, inspected tank production lines, supervised tactical missile tests, and convened an expanded meeting of the Workers’ Party Central Military Commission less than a week before the election. These actions signal that North Korea remains deeply engaged, albeit with a revised approach centered on conventional force enhancement.

The modernizing of North Korea’s conventional arsenal is not new. At the 8th Party Congress in 2021, Pyongyang declared a policy shift toward strengthening its military. Since then, it has introduced new short-range ballistic missiles, air-to-air missiles, and naval assets. Notably, North Korea has also tested these systems in real-world conditions. A recent report from the UN’s Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team revealed that North Korean weapons — such as the Bulsae-4 anti-tank rocket and Hwasong-11 variants — were used in the Ukraine conflict. According to the report, Russia has supplied North Korea with the results of these battlefield tests, allowing Pyongyang to make performance improvements.

In exchange for its arms support, North Korea is reportedly receiving advanced Russian military equipment, including electronic warfare systems, air defense vehicles, and operational training. These exchanges are not only enhancing North Korea’s military capabilities but also establishing it as a more operationally experienced force — developments that pose new challenges for South Korean defense planners.

The nature of this threat is further obscured by persistent underestimations. Some analysts continue to dismiss North Korean capabilities, citing its weak economy or occasional military mishaps. But such assessments risk blinding policymakers to the country’s capacity for adaptation and resilience. A case in point: after a failed destroyer launch at Chongjin Port last month, satellite imagery showed the vessel upright and recovered days later — an indication that Pyongyang remains capable of salvaging complex operations despite limited infrastructure.

In his inaugural presidential address on June 4, Lee stated, “Even the most expensive peace is better than war,” adding that “the best security is peace that does not require fighting.” While the sentiment is shared widely among South Koreans, the reality is far more complex. North Korea’s growing conventional threat, combined with its entrenched nuclear program and expanding ties with Russia, means that security cannot rest on aspirations alone.

Rather, the Lee administration must begin by developing a sober and unsentimental assessment of the threat. Just as a physician must review test results before prescribing treatment, the government must gather a clear picture of the evolving North Korean military posture before advancing policy. This involves reassessing the longstanding focus on nuclear deterrence to account for the sophistication and volume of North Korea’s conventional arsenal.

Translated from the JoongAng Ilbo using generative AI and edited by Korea JoongAng Daily staff.