How Kim Jong-un recast North Korea after Hanoi summit collapse through fear, propaganda and Russia

[A STUDY OF KIM JONG-UN 6]

North Korea’s approach to quarantine during the Covid-19 pandemic was brutally straightforward.

Anyone displaying symptoms, arriving from overseas or coming into contact with either group was designated a “medical surveillance subject” and placed under isolation.

“Quarantine is a polite way of putting it,” one North Korean defector recalled in testimony obtained by Amnesty International and other human rights organizations. “People were simply rounded up, separated and locked away. There was no support. If they died, they died. They were left to fend for themselves.”

Another defector described isolation as little different from a death sentence.

“The state had neither money nor medicine,” the source said. “Being quarantined was practically the same as being dead. Those who survived, survived. Those who died were buried. That was how it was handled.”

Sources familiar with North Korean affairs said quarantine often led to death not only from disease but also from starvation. Some people reportedly died after being confined for extended periods with little access to food. Those caught trying to escape were sometimes confined by nailing doors shut from the outside.

It was a period so severe that North Korean leader Kim Jong-un described it as the country’s “greatest upheaval since its founding.” Yet even as the crisis deepened, Kim rejected offers of foreign vaccine assistance. Instead, state propaganda promoted folk remedies, including drinking willow-leaf infusions three times a day.

The harsh response reflected a broader shift in Kim’s priorities after the collapse of the Hanoi summit in February 2019.

For Kim, the failed negotiations with the United States after the 2019 Hanoi summit were more than a diplomatic setback. His immediate concern became restoring the supreme leader's authority after a public blow to his prestige. Rather than focusing on treatment or mitigation, the regime prioritized total control. Kim sought to reestablish himself as an unrivaled figure, one capable of surpassing not only foreign adversaries but also the legacies of his father and grandfather.

That transformation is visible in the language of North Korea’s state media.

A joint analysis conducted by the JoongAng Ilbo and AI-based big data firm Speechlog examined all 137,513 articles published in the Rodong Sinmun, the North’s ruling Workers’ Party newspaper, between January 2016 and January 2026. The study analyzed more than 18 million words to trace changes in Kim’s rhetoric and the regime’s messaging.

Because the Rodong Sinmun functions as North Korea’s primary domestic propaganda outlet, its language reflects not what citizens want to hear but what Kim wants them to hear.

One of the most notable findings involved the word suryong, or “Great Leader.”

During the period of summit diplomacy between Kim, U.S. President Donald Trump during his first term and then-South Korean President Moon Jae-in, from 2018 through February 2019, the term appeared 12,601 times in the Rodong Sinmun. Following the collapse of the Hanoi summit, the figure surged to 34,694 mentions between 2019 and 2022.

The increase was significant, but the shift in meaning was even more telling.

Before Hanoi, suryong referred exclusively to North Korea’s founder Kim Il Sung (1912-1994) — Kim Jong-un’s grandfather. Beginning in 2020, however, the title started to be applied to Kim Jong-un himself. Usage accelerated sharply after the Eighth Workers’ Party Congress in January 2021.

Kim Jong-il (1941-2011), Kim Jong-un’s father, only received the title after his death. Kim Jong-un effectively granted it to himself at age 36.

In doing so, he elevated himself into the ranks of his predecessors while simultaneously beginning to separate himself from them.

The analysis divided Kim’s rule into four distinct periods: the nuclear-focused years of 2016 and 2017; the summit diplomacy era from 2018 through February 2019; the post-Hanoi and Covid-19 period from 2019 to 2022; and the period from 2023 through January this year, when North Korea’s strategic standing rose through closer ties with Russia.

From heir to power center, Ju-ae emerges

The third phase marked a turning point.

Among more than 9.64 million words examined, researchers categorized references glorifying the Paektu bloodline — North Korea’s ruling Kim clan — into two groups: praise directed at Kim Jong-un and praise directed at Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong-il.

During the first two periods, praise for Kim Jong-un’s predecessors remained more prevalent. In the third period, however, glorification of Kim surpassed that of his father and grandfather for the first time, accounting for 0.506 percent of analyzed words compared with 0.304 percent for the previous leaders.

In practical terms, for every 10,000 words published, approximately 50 praised Kim while only 30 praised his predecessors.

The gap widened further during the fourth period.

Researchers argued that the crossover represented more than a change in vocabulary. It signaled a transition from a system grounded primarily in inherited legitimacy to one increasingly centered on the authority and accomplishments of the current leader.

The trend became even clearer last February, when the Ninth Workers’ Party Congress took place from Feb. 19 to 25.

Mentions glorifying Kim Jong-un rose to 1.154 percent of all analyzed words, while glorification of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong-il accounted for just 0.321 percent.

The Rodong Sinmun also began applying the title “Great suryong,” historically reserved for Kim Il Sung, to Kim Jong-un ahead of the congress.

The congress itself repeatedly emphasized “great victories clearly distinguished from the past” and the birth of “a new era,” effectively formalizing the Kim era as distinct from those of previous generations.

The public emergence of Kim’s daughter Ju-ae in November 2022 can also be understood in this context.

As Kim sought to shed the image of merely being Kim Il Sung’s successor and position himself as the central figure of a fourth-generation hereditary system, he needed a symbolic successor of his own. Ju-ae’s introduction provided that image. Her appearance helped establish the concept not only of Kim as an heir but of Kim as a patriarch whose legacy would continue beyond him.

From peace and development to loyalty and control

The fallout from Hanoi also appears to have reshaped Kim’s view of economic development and engagement with the outside world.

Researchers divided key terms into six categories: economy and livelihoods, leader glorification, ideology and internal control, organizational consolidation, military affairs and diplomatic engagement.

During the summit diplomacy period, language associated with reconciliation and engagement flourished. Terms such as “national reconciliation” and “Panmunjom Declaration” emerged, while words including “peace,” “development” and “summit talks” rose sharply in frequency. The regime appeared optimistic that negotiations could lead to economic progress.

That optimism disappeared after the Hanoi summit.

The share of words associated with ideology and internal control rose from 24.9 percent to 28.9 percent, while terms linked to organizational consolidation increased from 17.4 percent to 24.8 percent.

Researchers described the period as one characterized by an intensified rhythm of management, control and mobilization.

Kim’s own rhetoric reflected growing anxiety. In April 2021, he invoked the possibility of a second “Arduous March,” a reference to the North’s devastating famine of the 1990s. Speaking before a gathering of party cell secretaries, the regime’s lowest-ranking political managers, he called for loyalty and sacrifice.

As a result, words such as “party cell secretary,” “hardship” and “loyalty” emerged as prominent terms during the third period. References to the “party,” “fatherland” and “revolution” also increased sharply.

How Kim’s definition of prosperity changed

The changing meaning of the word “prosperity” reveals perhaps the clearest evolution in Kim’s worldview.

During the first period, “United States” ranked as the No. 13 most common word associated with “prosperity,” far ahead of “economy,” which placed No. 382. Other top-ranked associated terms included “victory,” “struggle” and “army,” which ranked No. 14, No. 22 and No. 31, respectively. The pattern suggests that Kim viewed prosperity less in terms of economic abundance than of defeating the United States through military strength.

During the summit diplomacy period, prosperity became closely associated with “peace,” reflecting hopes that negotiations could lead to economic growth.

After the Hanoi summit, however, the term increasingly appeared alongside “frontal breakthrough campaign,” a slogan emphasizing self-reliance and overcoming hardship without outside assistance.

The message was clear: North Korea would achieve prosperity not through cooperation but through endurance.

That narrative shifted again beginning in 2023.

As North Korea deepened military cooperation with Russia and gained greater strategic leverage internationally, a new confidence emerged in state media.

Terms such as “comprehensive national rejuvenation,” “regional development policy” and “drive” appeared for the first time. Words related to the economy and livelihood accounted for 33.9 percent of all categorized terms, the highest level recorded during Kim’s decade in power.

One of the defining keywords of this period was “construction.”

The word had also appeared frequently during the Covid-19 years, but in a different context. During the third period, construction was commonly paired with words such as “frontal breakthrough,” “quarantine,” “ordeal” and “hardship.”

In the fourth period, however, the word was increasingly paired with terms such as “regions,” whose frequency rose 13.5-fold from the previous period, “rural communities,” up 6.2-fold, and “housing,” which increased 2.9-fold.

The shift reflects Kim’s flagship Regional Development 20×10 Policy, launched in 2024. The initiative aims to build factories in 20 rural areas every year for a decade.

The policy is intended to strengthen local production, improve the supply of goods and create a more self-contained economic structure capable of reducing dependence on foreign assistance.

Less talk of Pyongyang, more focus on Hwasong District

Yet the data also reveal contradictions.

While local development became a central theme, mentions of Pyongyang declined sharply, falling from 0.293 percent of analyzed words to 0.075 percent.

At the same time, a new term appeared 728 times: “Hwasong District.”

Hwasong is the site of one of Pyongyang’s most ambitious luxury apartment developments. The pattern suggests that while propaganda increasingly emphasizes balanced regional development, Kim remains deeply committed to transforming the capital into a showcase city.

The contrast highlights the gap between rhetoric and reality in North Korea’s development strategy.

The broader analysis suggests that Kim’s current vision centers on transforming North Korea into what he views as a modern, prosperous state. In the fourth period, the word “prosperity” increasingly appeared alongside terms such as “state,” “patriotism” and “regions.” Similar themes dominated messaging around the Ninth Party Congress, with phrases such as “comprehensive national rejuvenation” and “comprehensive socialist development” recurring.

Yet another contradiction emerges when comparing Kim’s own speeches with state media coverage.

In Kim’s address to the Ninth Party Congress, ideological control accounted for 36.6 percent of the content and military affairs accounted for 35.4 percent. Economy- and livelihood-related topics represented only 3.7 percent.

The most frequently used words were “army” and “struggle.”

By contrast, economy- and livelihood-related topics dominated Rodong Sinmun coverage in February, accounting for 33.9 percent of content. New terms such as “modern livestock industry” and “modern rural communities” appeared for the first time in a decade. Military-related content accounted for just 5.4 percent.

The discrepancy offers a glimpse into how the North Korean system operates.

Kim’s own rhetoric emphasizes military power, loyalty and North Korea’s status as a nuclear-armed state aligned with Russia. State media, meanwhile, pressures local officials to deliver economic performance and increase production.

The result is a dual-track narrative: military mobilization at the top and economic mobilization below.

Russia dependence looms

Russia has become an increasingly important component of that strategy.

Beginning in the fourth period, the word “prosperity” started appearing alongside terms such as “Ukraine” and “strategic partnership.” The association suggests that Kim increasingly views military support for Russia as a pathway to economic benefits and political leverage.

New military-industrial terms, including “defense industry,” “munitions industry,” “artillery shells” and “ammunition,” also emerged in large numbers.

On the surface, North Korea appears closer than ever to achieving Kim’s long-standing goal of simultaneously advancing nuclear capabilities and economic development.

Yet the 2026 version of that strategy contains a variable that was not part of the original equation: Russia.

As the civilian economy becomes increasingly intertwined with a wartime military-industrial economy, North Korea’s dependence on Moscow is likely to deepen.

Kim may view his decision to align with Russia rather than China as a historic strategic achievement that has elevated North Korea’s international standing.

But it may also have moved the country further away from the self-reliance that he has so often championed.

If prosperity is possible only because Russia makes it possible, then Kim may not ultimately be the true master of the system he has worked so hard to build.

BY YOO JEE-HYE, CHUNG YEONG-GYO, SHIM SEOK-YONG [shin.minhee@joongang.co.kr]