Drone swarms, missile strikes and worse: Kim Jong-un may apply lessons from Ukraine war to Korean Peninsula

[A STUDY OF KIM JONG-UN 4]

Russia’s massive drone and missile strikes against Ukraine in December last year exposed a new reality of modern warfare: Cheap unmanned aircraft can overwhelm even advanced air defense systems by forcing defenders to burn through costly interceptor missiles.

South Korean and overseas analysts now warn that North Korean leader Kim Jong-un may try to apply lessons from the war in Ukraine to the Korean Peninsula after North Korean soldiers deployed to the war gain battlefield experience and military technology. 

Russia launched airstrikes across Ukraine on Dec. 5 and 6 last year. The attacks targeted power plants and railway stations. Moscow launched an attack with 653 long-range suicide drones along with 51 missiles, including Kinzhal hypersonic missiles designed to evade air defenses at high speed, Kh-101 stealth cruise missiles used for long-range precision strikes, Iskander-K and Kalibr cruise missiles capable of low-altitude flight to avoid radar detection and Iskander-M and KN-23 ballistic missiles built to strike targets quickly with maneuverable trajectories.

Ukraine’s military said it shot down 585 drones, achieving an 89.6 percent interception rate. But the effort quickly drained its air defense resources.

As swarms of drones overwhelmed the defense network, Ukraine intercepted only 30 of the 51 missiles, a defense rate of 58.9 percent. Of those 30 interceptions, 29 involved slower cruise missiles. Ukraine failed to stop most of the hypersonic and ballistic missiles.

The destruction of power plants in the middle of winter halted heating systems. Residents in Kyiv told reporters in January that electricity came on for only six hours each day.

People warmed their hands over gas burners and stayed awake through the night. Evening greetings in Kyiv no longer centered on “good night.” Instead, people wished each other “a quiet night without air raid sirens.”

A brutal but simple equation now shapes the battlefield. Militaries cannot ignore low-cost drones that fly toward high-value targets. Defenders still consume at least one interceptor missile, whether they target a drone or a missile. Once attackers overwhelm defenses with sheer numbers, even advanced air defense systems become saturated.

Cheap drones, costly defense

Kim likely took note of that equation after sending troops to support Russia.

North Korea gained battlefield experience in combined drone and artillery operations. Pyongyang also created a specialized drone unit and started to build a drone production system, according to a briefing that the National Intelligence Service gave lawmakers on Feb. 12.

In actual combat, however, Kim cannot use the nuclear weapons that he spent years developing. Russia also treats nuclear weapons mainly as a deterrent and has not used them on the battlefield. Conventional military strength still determines the outcome of war.

With nuclear weapons in the background, North Korea likely wants asymmetric capabilities that can force South Korean and U.S. air forces to focus on defense. That strategy would require large numbers of drones and interceptor missiles.

North Korea studies Ukraine battlefield lessons

The JoongAng Ilbo used AI to simulate a possible scenario in which North Korea attempts to recreate Russia’s nationwide strikes against Ukraine on the Korean Peninsula.

The simulation reflected battlefield data that the Ukrainian military released on drones and missiles, related research papers and North Korea’s known weapons systems. Several current and former military officials and civilian experts also reviewed the scenario.

In the scenario shared in a 196-second video, Shahed-type suicide drones — designed to crash into targets and explode on impact — advance toward South Korea. Around 100 infiltrate through the Yellow Sea and another 100 through the East Sea.

Half are decoys designed to overwhelm and confuse air defenses. Flying at low altitude, they evade radar coverage. The rest are AI-guided attack drones capable of autonomously identifying targets. Their objectives are U.S. and South Korean air bases in South Korea.

The first wave reaches the bases. South Korea's air defenses respond immediately, destroying most of the drones, but debris crashes onto the runways. Soon after, another 200 drones begin infiltrating from both coasts — this time accompanied by low-flying Hwasal-class cruise missiles, designed for terrain-hugging penetration attacks.

Air defenses engage again, but not every threat can be intercepted.

At the same time, long-range artillery and missiles from 600 millimeter large multiple rocket launchers bombard the Seoul metropolitan area, pushing South Korea’s air defense network toward saturation. Amid the chaos, South Korean maneuver units are ambushed by hidden drones. AI-controlled drones precisely strike lead vehicles, halting entire convoys. Electromagnetic pulse attacks — bursts of energy capable of disabling electronics and communications systems — follow, leaving friendly forces blind and deaf against an unseen enemy.

Meanwhile, some cruise missiles penetrate deeper, targeting radar nodes and command centers. KN-series short-range ballistic missiles rain down. Their unpredictable terminal maneuvers defeat remaining interception attempts. Hidden among the conventional warheads are rockets armed with Hwasan-31 tactical nuclear warheads, compact battlefield nuclear devices designed for short-range delivery systems. A single miscalculation could mean catastrophe. In a blinding flash, entire bases could vanish.

The scenario reflects a broader shift in modern warfare, where conflict no longer revolves solely around warhead size and missile range. Cheap drones can force defenders to expend expensive interceptor missiles in what experts describe as a new “cost-imposition strategy.” If defenders fail to stop the attacks, national security can collapse. Even if they succeed, the financial and operational burden remains severe.

Kim may pursue a strategy to drain the enemy’s resources.

During the Cold War, cost-imposition strategies centered on the nuclear arms race between the major powers. Modern warfare increasingly resembles a smaller-scale contest in which drones and interceptor missiles drain the enemy’s resources.

A war through drones

Russia has mixed large numbers of drones with missile strikes throughout the war in Ukraine. The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine said last month that Russia has launched more than 14,230 attack drones since the war began, compared to more than 13,300 missiles. Russia used 10.7 times more drones than expensive missiles, according to the Ukrainian military.

Military experts estimate that North Korea can produce a drone for roughly 20 million won ($13,200). South Korea’s Hyunmoo-II missile costs between 2 billion won and 4 billion won per unit. A Patriot interceptor missile costs about $4 million.

North Korea could build 1,000 drones for about 20 billion won, while South Korea could spend tens of trillions of won to intercept them. Militaries use multiple layers of defense in combat, but in a long war, the attacker still often has the advantage.

In an interview with the JoongAng Ilbo in January, former principal deputy assistant secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs at the U.S. Department of State, Evans Revere, said North Korea had learned how to carry out advanced drone warfare, conduct modern combined operations and counter sophisticated weapons systems supplied by the United States and NATO, adding that the importance of those lessons should not be underestimated.

Russia, which effectively serves as North Korea’s military instructor, produces thousands of Shahed-136 and Shahed-131 drones each month. Designed as long-range attack drones that strike targets by crashing into them, the drones are known in Russia as the Geran-2 and Geran-1. Each drone reportedly costs between 20 million won and 40 million won to manufacture.

Russia also deploys decoy drones called Gerbera that cost about 10 million won and are made of plywood and plastic parts to confuse air defenses.

When 19 Shahed drones entered Polish airspace in September last year, NATO scrambled fighter jets and air defense assets from several countries. Polish F-16s and Dutch F-35s responded to the threat. NATO aircraft launched air-to-air missiles worth tens of millions of won to shoot down the drones, but intercepted only four of them.

Kim could lower costs even further by relying on North Korea’s state-controlled labor and Russian technical assistance, which reduces trial and error during development.

Russia becomes North Korea’s drone instructor

South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense does not disclose exact figures, but it reportedly operates about 150 batteries of Cheongung-I and Cheongung-II missile systems, along with Patriot PAC-2, PAC-3 and PAC-3 MSE systems. These are air defense systems designed to detect, track and shoot down incoming aircraft, ballistic missiles and other aerial threats.

A standard battery usually includes eight launchers. Cheongung launchers carry eight missiles each, while Patriot launchers carry between four and 16 missiles.

In theory, South Korea could respond simultaneously to roughly 1,200 to 1,500 incoming targets. Analysts say the military must prepare for drone attacks that exceed that number.

“Our military built its air defense network mainly to stop long-range artillery and ballistic missiles,” said Cho Sang-keun, a research professor at KAIST. “If Shahed-style long-range drones, long-range artillery and short-range ballistic missiles arrive simultaneously, commanders could struggle to prioritize responses. Without an AI-based command-and-control system that can quickly analyze every incoming attack and automate strike decisions, even advanced air defense assets may become ineffective.”

South Korea differs from Ukraine because it maintains a relatively dense network of short-range air defense systems at the army level. The South Korean military still operates older systems such as 20-millimeter (0.8-inch) Vulcan guns, which use rapid-fire cannon rounds to shoot down low-flying aircraft and drones at close range, along with newer systems such as Shingung missiles, which are man-portable missiles designed to hit aircraft at short range, and the Biho hybrid air defense platform, which combines radar-guided cannons and missiles to engage low-altitude aerial targets.

Still, analysts question whether those systems can keep pace with rapidly evolving drone technology. Vulcan guns have an effective range of roughly 1,700 to 2,000 meters (5,580 to 6,560 feet), while Shahed drones can fly at altitudes of up to 4,000 meters.

Russian forces recently upgraded the Kometa antijamming system on Shahed drones from 12 channels to 16 channels, improving their ability to resist electronic warfare by maintaining navigation signals even when adversaries try to jam or disrupt them. Analysts believe North Korea could acquire that technology as well.

Russia also introduced fiber-optic drones during the first half of last year. Those drones connect to operators via 0.2-millimeter-thick optical fiber cables, rendering radio jamming ineffective.

A Ukrainian military official said fiber-optic drones are already becoming outdated compared to newer “Molniya,” or “lightning,” drones, which are launched from catapult systems that quickly propel them into the air without a runway or traditional takeoff equipment.

The official said the Molniya drone can fly as far as 50 kilometers (31 miles). Longer drone ranges force opposing air defense and mechanized units to move farther from the front lines.

Drone technology evolves faster than defenses

Analysts believe Russia’s drone upgrades will likely transfer directly to North Korea.

Kim has already shown signs that he plans to reorganize the military around unmanned systems. In November 2024, Kim visited research institutes and factories under the Unmanned Aerial Technology Complex (translated) and observed performance tests of suicide drones. He ordered officials to establish a mass production system “as soon as possible.”

Kim’s focus has already shifted from quality to quantity.

Ukrainian military officials also speculate that North Korea could create a dedicated drone command. A source familiar with the matter said that roughly 80 North Korean IT specialists are currently studying drone technology and operational tactics at educational institutions in Moscow.

Some analysts, however, caution against overstating the power of drones.

“South Korea and the United States should instead expand their superior airpower and strike North Korea’s solid-fuel short-range ballistic missiles before launch,” a former South Korean Air Force intelligence officer said.

North Korea has also improved its short-range ballistic missile capabilities with Russian assistance.

A report released last year by the Friedrich Naumann Foundation said that North Korea had transferred at least 248 KN-23 missiles to Russia as of September 2025. Ukrainian intelligence officials said the KN-23’s targeting error improved from 500 to 1,500 meters early in the war to about 50 to 100 meters recently.

Analysts suspect Russian engineers either modified the missiles directly or transferred technology that allowed North Korea to reduce targeting errors. The war in Ukraine has effectively become a real-world training ground for how North Korea could fight on the Korean Peninsula.

Ukraine war becomes North Korea’s testing ground

In an interview with the JoongAng Ilbo in January, Victor Cha, president of the Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department and Korea chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said the biggest benefit Kim gains from supporting Russia is the battlefield experience and missile operation data that North Korean soldiers bring back from the war.

North Korea’s growing experience in modern warfare has also renewed attention on strategies designed to keep enemy aircraft from operating freely, another key feature of the war in Ukraine.

Western air defense systems have prevented Russian fighter jets from advancing deep into Ukrainian territory. Russian aircraft instead launch air-to-ground missiles from inside Russian airspace. Analysts say that reality explains why Russia relies heavily on drone attacks instead of sustained bombing campaigns over Ukrainian cities.

Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence has reported that North Korea received from Russia one ground-based Pantsir-S1 air defense system, which uses missiles and rapid-fire guns to shoot down aircraft, drones and incoming missiles, along with two or three naval Pantsir-M or Pantsir-ME modules, ship-based versions designed to defend warships against aerial threats.

Analysts believe North Korea could use those systems to begin mass production of its own antiaircraft missile systems, such as its new Pyoljji missile. 

BY YOO JEE-HYE, LEE YU-JUNG, PARK HYUN-JU [paik.jihwan@joongang.co.kr]